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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
date", was necessary to the rendition of a complete decision
of the cause. While, in view of the wide-spread acceptance
of the generally applicable rule that provision for accelera-
tion at the holder's uncontrolled option defeats negotiabil-
ity, the Court cannot be fairly criticized for blindly follow-
ing it rather than inquiring into its reason and soundness;
yet the affirmance and reaffirmance of the lower court's deci-
sion can only be characterized as an erroneous application
of a dubious rule.
It is to be regretted that no more than four of the mem-
bers of the Court could be persuaded to recognize that the
decision on the original argument of the case was an obvi-
ous mistake which, as a result, has become perpetuated un-
der the rule that an even division of an appellate court
causes an automatic affirmance of the ruling before them.
EFFECT OF ACQUITAL FOR. ASSAULT ON TRIAL
FOR MURDER WHEN VICTIM SUB-
SEQUENTLY DIES
Crawford v. State'
The defendant-appellant was indicted for murder by
the grand jury of Baltimore City. To this indictment he
filed a special plea to the effect that he had been arraigned
before a magistrate charged with "Assaulting and shooting
Loretta Anderson (c), age nine months, with a pistol in
Baltimore City, State of Maryland, on August 7, 1937," and
that after a full and complete hearing before the magistrate
he was found not guilty, and that the assaulting and shoot-
ing of which he was thus found not guilty was the same
assaulting -and shooting alleged to have later caused the
death for which he was charged in the indictment for mur-
der. A demurrer to this plea was sustained. The defendant
was tried and convicted of second degree murder by the
court sitting as a jury.
Defendant contended, upon appeal, that the court erred
in sustaining the demurrer, relying solely upon the doctrine
of res judicata; that since he was found not guilty of the
crime of which he was charged before the magistrate, his
acquittal created an estoppel by judgment which barred
the State from prosecuting him upon a more serious charge
growing out of the less. Against this the State made two
contentions, (1) that the magistrate had no jurisdiction
1197 A. 866 (Md. 1938).
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of the offense for which he was tried, and hence the acquittal
was a mere nullity, and, (2) that his acquittal of assaulting
with a pistol, being for a lesser offense than murder, did not
estop the State from prosecuting him upon the murder
charge. The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the
lower court upon the first contention of the State, and did
not discuss the second contention.
Accepting, for the sake of the argument, the correctness
of the Court's conclusion on the first contention2 made by
the State on appeal in the principal case, this casenote pro-
poses to discuss the implications of the second, and unan-
swered contention.
That no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put
in jeopardy, is both a provision of the Constitution of the
United States and that of Maryland, and an established rule
of the Common Law, and a plea of former jeopardy is good
under either. The rule forbids a second trial for the same
offense whether the accused at the former trial was ac-
quitted or convicted.3 Having the rule, the problem then
arises of determining what is a second trial for the same
offense, where the act done results in different criminal
liabilities. A test almost universally applied to determine
the identity of the offense is to ascertain the identity, in
character and effect, of the evidence in both cases. If the
evidence which is necessary to support the second indict-
ment was admissible under the former, was related to the
same crime, and was sufficient if believed by the jury to have
warranted a conviction of that crime, the offenses are ident-
ical, and a plea of former conviction or acquittal is a bar.'
Where the act done results in criminal liability of differ-
ent degrees and the first prosecution is for the greater of-
fense, the rule is that if the lesser offense, for which the
accused is put in jeopardy, is an element of the greater of-
fense of which he has been acquitted or convicted, arising
out of the same criminal act, the plea of former jeopardy is
a bar to such subsequent prosecution. But where the lesser
offense is a substantive offense, not involved in, or not a
necessary ingredient of the greater offense, and the evi-
dence to support it was not essential to a conviction in the
2 The Court's conclusion was that a charge of "assaulting and shooting
. . . with a pistol" was, in effect, one of assault with intent to kill. Un-
der Baltimore City Charter, Sec. 724, a Magistrate's Court has jurisdic-
tion of simple assaults only.
3 Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 466, 121 A. 354 (1923). For discussion of
Constitutional provision, see note, Extent to Which Rights Secured by the
First Eight Amendments to the Federal Constitution Are Protected Against
State Action by the Fourteenth Amendment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 174.
1 16 C. J. 265.
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former case, the plea is not a bar to a prosecution under an
indictment charging him with the commission of such lesser
offense.5  Thus, where, upon an indictment for murder or
manslaughter a defendant can be convicted of an assault,
an acquittal upon such indictment will bar a prosecution
for the assault; but the rule is otherwise where a conviction
for the assault cannot be had upon an indictment for the
higher crime.'
This is assuming that both the first and second prosecu-
tions are in courts which have jurisdiction over both the
greater and lesser crime.7 A difference of opinion prevails
as to whether conviction of a minor offense in an inferior
court bars a prosecution for a higher crime where the in-
ferior court does not have jurisdiction of the higher crime.
Some courts take the view that the State cannot, after prose-
cuting the accused before a Justice of the Peace for an of-
fense within his jurisdiction, avoid the effect of the judg-
ment upon the theory that such an offense was an ingredi-
ent of a higher crime of which the Justice had no jurisdic-
tion, while others hold that a conviction of a minor offense
in an inferior court, such as a Justice's court, does not bar
a prosecution for a higher crime of which the inferior court
has no jurisdiction.8 Admittedly, where the Justice had no
jurisdiction of the crime for which the accused was tried
before him, any verdict rendered is a nullity which does not,
in legal contemplation, jeopardize life or limb.9 This would
dispose of any contention that the doctrine would apply in
the principal case.
When, after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes,
for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the
character of the offense and, together with the facts existing
at the time, constitutes a new and distinct crime, an acquittal
or conviction of the first offense is not a bar to an indictment
for the other distinct crime. This principle is the founda-
tion for the universal rule that at common law a conviction
for assault while the person assaulted is still living is no bar
to a prosecution for murder or manslaughter instituted
after death has resulted to the person assaulted on account
of the injuries received, and the trial for murder does not
'Gilpin v. State, supra n. 3.
0 16 C. J. 275. See also 15 Am. Jur. 63.
7 Where the Justice of the Peace and the Criminal Court have concurrent
jurisdiction of the same crime, a trial before the Justice will bar another
trial in the Criminal Court, Friend v. State, 2 A. (2nd) 430 (Md. 1938).
* 15 Am. Jur. 62.
* State v. Sutton, 4 Gill 494 (1846) and other Marylanti decisions support
the view that any verdict which Is a nullity for any reason, is not jeopardy
which will be a bar to subsequent prosecution.
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place the defendant twice in jeopardy.10 There is also
text authority for the proposition that the same result would
be reached after an acquittal for assault." As is pointed
out by one writer, all of the cases cited in support of the
proposition were cases of conviction of the assault. In com-
menting on this rule, he observes this, but concludes, "There
is no apparent reason why the same argument would not
apply if the defendant had been acquitted on the assault
charge. However, it is rather difficult to conceive of a
prosecution for homicide resulting from an assault where
the defendant has been found, innocent of committing the
assault. "'2
While jeopardy, in its constitutional and common law
sense, has a strict application to criminal prosecutions only,
a similar doctrine is applicable in both criminal and civil
suits, i. e., the doctrine of res judicata, or estoppel by judg-
ment.' Speaking of the two doctrines, the Court of Ap-
peals has said, "In criminal cases the plea of formerjeopardy and res judicata are so similar as to be hardly dis-
tinguishable, and in many criminal cases, where the plea of
former jeopardy was made, the court in discussing the ques-
tion applied the principles of res judicata. "'4 Quoting from
Freeman on Judgments15 the Court adds, " 'There is no
reason why a final judgment in a criminal case or pro-
ceeding should not, under proper circumstances, be given
conclusive effect as an estoppel or bar. The same policy
which dictates the rule in civil cases requires it in criminal
cases. ' "16
Briefly stated, the doctrine is that an existing final judg-
ment or decree rendered upon the merits, and without fraud
*or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all other actions or suits in
the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent juris-
diction, on the points and matters in issue in the first suit."
10 15 Am. Jur. 66.
"16 C. J. 275.
12 Note 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 210. But see the answer to this in the closing
paragraphs of this casenote.
23 Hochheimer, Crimes and Criminal Procedure (2nd Ed.) Sec. 46.
"State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 164, 180 A. 266, 185 A. 3,50 (1935).
15 Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.) Sec. 648.
'8 State v. Coblentz, supra note 14, 169 Md. 164. As to judgments in
criminal cases as rcs judicata in civil suits and vice versa, see 15 R. C. L.
1000, where it is pointed out that there is a dissimilarity in objects, issues.
results, procedure and parties in the two actions, and that different rules of
evidence apply, both as to the weight of the evidence and the competency
of witnesses, and that therefore the doctrine does not generally apply. See
also 34 C. J. 970.
17 15 R. C. L. 429.
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A judgment on the merits rendered by an inferior court,
such as that of a Justice of the Peace, is a bar to another
suit between the same parties on the same cause of action,
either in another court of the same grade or rank or in any
other court,"8 and is conclusive on the matters at issue in
the trial, unless, of course, there has been an appeal and
reversal. However, here again the principal case may be
disposed of on the ground that the verdict of the magistrate
was a nullity.
Another doctrine which may be considered here is the
common law doctrine of merger. Though this doctrine has
been abolished in many states, it presumably still exists in
Maryland. 19 The rule is expressed by the proposition that
if an act constitutes two crimes of different grades, that of
the lower grade is merged in the one of the higher grade;
i. e. where the same criminal act constitutes both a felony
and a misdemeanor, the misdemeanor is merged into the
felony. Under this rule, no conviction of the lesser crime
could be had upon indictment for the greater, where the
evidence showed that the greater had been committed. An-
other result of the rule was that prior conviction or acquittal
of the misdemeanor could not be pleaded in bar of an indict-
ment for the felony.20 As applied to a situation such as
presented by the principal case, this doctrine would not
change the result, because here the felony was not complete
at the time the trial for the misdemeanor took place, so there
was neither a conviction of the lesser crime under an indict-
ment for the greater, nor was there any evidence, at that
time, that the greater had been committed.
Applying the principles set forth above to questions
which might arise had the magistrate's judgment in the
principal case not been a nullity it must first be noticed
that it is possibly only in the case of homicide that a trial
could take place before the crime was complete. An at-
tempted homicide may not result in the completed crime
until some time later, and the same is the case of assault
with intent to murder. In each of these cases the crime
becomes complete without any further criminal action on
the part of the accused. In the case of other crimes, if the
attempt does not result immediately in the completed crime
11 34 C. J. 759.
1" See Klein v. State, 151 Md. 484, 491, 135 A. 591 (1926), where the Court
assumed that the doctrine still existed, with respect to common law felonies
but limited it. And see also Gilpin v. State, supra n. 3, 142 Md. 468, for a
discussion of the doctrine and a statement that the same act must involve
both offenses for the application of the doctrine.
"0 14 Am. Jur. 760; Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes (3rd Ed.) Sec. 6;
16 C. J. 59.
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there can be no completed crime without another attempt,
or some further action, on the part of the accused. Is it,
then, really inconsistent to have an acquittal for assault and
a conviction for murder arising out of the same alleged act?
Murder is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought, express or implied. Malice is im-
plied (among other examples) when an act is wilfully done
or a duty wilfully omitted, and the natural tendency of the
act or omission is to cause death or great bodily harm. A
person may be guilty of murder at common law, although
there may have been no actual intent to kill.2 1 An assault
is an attempt to commit a battery, and intent, either actual
or apparent, is an essential of the crime.22 Thus there can
be no conviction of assault without the intent, on the part of
the accused, to inflict bodily injury, but a conviction for
murder can be had without any intent on the part of the ac-
cused to injure anybody.2" Thus an assault is not a neces-
sary element of murder, though of course it would be pres-
ent in many cases.
PARTNERSHIP BY ESTOPPEL BASED ON A
HOLDING OUT BY ONE OTHER THAN
THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE HELD
Brocato v. Serio'
Suit was brought on a renewal note of "S. Brocato &
Son," a firm operating a market stall. Both defendants,
husband and wife, had been for some years closely connected
with this business, although it appeared that there was no
actual partnership. The plaintiff's knowledge of this con-
nection was slight. The original loan had been made four-
teen years before trial by the plaintiff in the presence of
both defendants and S. Brocato, the husband's father. All
later negotiations had been through plaintiff's sister-in-law.
On the death of the father, and at plaintiff's request, the
defendant wife signed her name to the renewal note and
signed her husband's name without his consent. The trial
court held that the defendants were estopped to deny lia-
1 Clark and Marshall, op. cit. supra n. 20, Sec. 239.
2 Ibid, Sec. 197.
8 The principal case involved exactly such a situation. The defendant
fired through a closed door.
2 173 Md. 374, 196 Atl. 125 (1937).
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